审校 | 唧唧堂经济金融学写作小组：绵绵编辑 | 小巴 1.分散的凯恩斯主义经济中的供给和需求与COVID-19危机的应用 Supply and Demand in Disaggregated Keynesian Economies with an Application to the COVID-19 Crisis 我们在一个具有多部门、多要素、投入产出链、名义工资向下僵化、信贷约束和零下边界的分散模型中研究供给和需求冲击。我们用这个模型解释COVID-19危机，一个综合的供应和需求冲击，是如何影响产出、失业和通货膨胀，并如何导致紧张和松弛的劳动力市场共存。研究成果表明，负的部门供应冲击是滞胀的，而负的需求冲击是通缩的，尽管两者都能引起凯恩斯式的失业。此外，生产中的互补性放大了供应冲击带来的凯恩斯式溢出效应，但对需求冲击来说却减轻了这种效应。这意味着，上述互补性会降低总需求刺激的有效性。在一个设定在美国场景的定量模型中，我们发现供应和需求冲击各自解释了2020年2月至5月实际GDP减少的一半左右。虽然有高达6%的凯恩斯式失业，但这主要集中在某些特定市场。因此，总需求刺激的效果是所有劳动力市场都松弛的典型经济衰退的四分之一。 We study supply and demand shocks in a disaggregated model with multiple sectors, multiple factors, input-output linkages, downward nominal wage rigidities, credit-constraints, and a zero lower bound. We use the model to understand how the COVID-19 crisis, an omnibus supply and demand shock, affects output, unemployment, and inflation, and leads to the coexistence of tight and slack labor markets. We show that negative sectoral supply shocks are stagflationary, whereas negative demand shocks are deflationary, even though both can cause Keynesian unemployment. Furthermore, complementarities in production amplify Keynesian spillovers from supply shocks but mitigate them for demand shocks. This means that complementarities reduce the effectiveness of aggregate demand stimulus. In a stylized quantitative model of the United States, we find supply and demand shocks each explain about one-half of the reduction in real GDP from February to May 2020. Although there was as much as 6 percent Keynesian unemployment, this was concentrated in certain markets. Hence, aggregate demand stimulus is one quarter as effective as in a typical recession where all labor markets are slack. 参考文献：Baqaee, David, and Emmanuel Farhi. 2022. "Supply and Demand in Disaggregated Keynesian Economies with an Application to the COVID-19 Crisis." American Economic Review, 112 (5): 1397-1436. 2. COVID-19的宏观经济影响：负向供应冲击会导致需求短缺吗？Macroeconomic Implications of COVID-19: Can Negative Supply Shocks Cause Demand Shortages? 受到COVID-19大流行的启发，我们提出凯恩斯供应冲击的新理论：这种冲击降低了经济中某一部门的潜在产出，但通过减少其他部门的需求，最终将总体经济活动推至潜在水平以下。当部门间的替代弹性相对较低，时际替代弹性相对较高，且市场不完全时，凯恩斯式的供给冲击更有可能发生。财政政策乘数会相对较小，但财政转移的保险效益可以得到加强。企业退出和就业岗位的缺失可以放大和传播这种冲击。 Motivated by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, we present a theory of Keynesian supply shocks: shocks that reduce potential output in a sector of the economy, but that, by reducing demand in other sectors, ultimately push aggregate activity below potential. A Keynesian supply shock is more likely when the elasticity of substitution between sectors is relatively low, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is relatively high, and markets are incomplete. Fiscal policy can display a smaller multiplier, but the insurance benefit of fiscal transfers can be enhanced. Firm exits and job destruction can amplify and propagate the shock. 参考文献：Guerrieri, Veronica, Guido Lorenzoni, Ludwig Straub, and Iván Werning. 2022. "Macroeconomic Implications of COVID-19: Can Negative Supply Shocks Cause Demand Shortages?" American Economic Review, 112 (5): 1437-74. 3. 有效需求的失效和货币稳定政策的局限性 Effective Demand Failures and the Limits of Monetary Stabilization Policy COVID-19大流行对稳定政策的挑战首先来自于支付循环流动的中断，导致凯恩斯（1936）所说的 "有效需求 "的失效。因此，许多部门的经济活动可能是低效的，而利率政策不能消除扭曲--不是因为对利率的降低程度有限制，而是因为利率的降低不能刺激正确的需求。相反，财政转移支付很适合于解决基本问题，在某些情况下可以实现资源的最优配置。 The challenge for stabilization policy presented by the COVID-19 pandemic stems above all from disruption of the circular flow of payments, resulting in a failure of what Keynes (1936) calls "effective demand." As a consequence, economic activity in many sectors can be inefficiently low, and interest-rate policy cannot eliminate the distortions—not because of a limit on the extent to which interest rates can be reduced, but because interest-rate reductions fail to stimulate demand of the right sorts. Fiscal transfers are instead well suited to addressing the fundamental problem, and can under certain circumstances achieve a first-best allocation of resources. 参考文献：Woodford, Michael. 2022. "Effective Demand Failures and the Limits of Monetary Stabilization Policy." American Economic Review, 112 (5): 1475-1521. 4. 不完全信息下或有合同的议价 Bargaining over Contingent Contracts under Incomplete Information 我们研究了在实施协议时私人信息变得公开或可核查的情况下对或有合同的议价。我们提出了一个简单的、两阶段的博弈，其中包含了议价的重要方面。我们描述了各方总是达成协议的均衡，并研究了它们在议价限制消失时的局限性。在不严格的正则性条件下，我们表明所有中期有效的极限都从属于Myerson（1984）的公理解。此外，如果均衡观点满足no-signaling-what-you-don't-know，那么所有的限制都必是临时有效的。研究结果可延伸到其他议价协议。 We study bargaining over contingent contracts in problems where private information becomes public or verifiable when the time comes to implement the agreement. We suggest a simple, two-stage game that incorporates important aspects of bargaining. We characterize equilibria in which parties always reach agreement, and study their limits as bargaining frictions vanish. Under mild regularity conditions, we show all interim-efficient limits belong to Myerson's (1984) axiomatic solution. Furthermore, all limits must be interim efficient if equilibrium beliefs satisfy no-signaling-what-you-don't-know. Results extend to other bargaining protocols. 参考文献：de Clippel, Geoffroy, Jack Fanning, and Kareen Rozen. 2022. "Bargaining over Contingent Contracts under Incomplete Information." American Economic Review, 112 (5): 1522-54. 5. 运河上的叛军：1650-1911年中国中断的贸易通道和社会冲突 Rebel on the Canal: Disrupted Trade Access and Social Conflict in China, 1650–1911 本文研究了中国大运河--世界上最大和最古老的人工水道--的废弃的影响，该废弃举措是对区域贸易通道的破坏。通过使用覆盖262年的575个县的原始数据集，结果显示运河的废弃导致了19世纪席卷华北地区的社会动荡。运河沿线的县在运河关闭后，相对于非运河沿线的县，其叛乱率增加了117%。我们的研究结果强调了持续通达的贸易路线在减少冲突方面的重要作用。 This paper examines the effects of the abandonment of China's Grand Canal—the world's largest and oldest artificial waterway—which served as a disruption to regional trade access. Using an original dataset covering 575 counties over 262 years, we show that the canal's abandonment contributed to the social turmoil that engulfed North China in the nineteenth century. Counties along the canal experienced an additional 117 percent increase in rebelliousness after the canal's closure relative to their non-canal counterparts. Our findings highlight the important role that continued access to trade routes plays in reducing conflict. 参考文献：Cao, Yiming, and Shuo Chen. 2022. "Rebel on the Canal: Disrupted Trade Access and Social Conflict in China, 1650–1911." American Economic Review, 112 (5): 1555-90. 6. 柠檬市场中对可分割物品的议价 Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons 我们研究具有可分割性和相互依赖性的商品的议价。买方和卖方交易一种可分割的商品，卖方私下了解商品或高或低的质量，交易有正向收益且商品数量递减，买方在一段时间内提出报价。可分割性在买方现期和预期之间引入了一个新的竞争渠道：买方分散购买高质量商品的倾向是对他是不利的，因为随着议价摩擦的消失且商品变得可以任意分割，高质量的商品随着时间的推移被稳定地交易，买方的收益缩减为零。 We study bargaining with divisibility and interdependent values. A buyer and a seller trade a divisible good. The seller is privately informed about its quality, which can be high or low. Gains from trade are positive and decreasing in quantity. The buyer makes offers over time. Divisibility introduces a new channel of competition between the buyer's present and future selves. The buyer's temptation to split the purchases of the high-quality good is detrimental to him. As bargaining frictions vanish and the good becomes arbitrarily divisible, the high-quality good is traded smoothly over time and the buyer's payoff shrinks to zero. 参考文献：Gerardi, Dino, Lucas Maestri, and Ignacio Monzón. 2022. "Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons." American Economic Review, 112 (5): 1591-1620. 7. 对保险的需求和授权的理由：来自职工赔偿保险的证据 The Demand for Insurance and Rationale for a Mandate: Evidence from Workers' Compensation Insurance 职工赔偿保险为与工作有关的伤害提供无过失保险，该保险在美国几乎所有州都是强制的。我们使用没有强制保险的一个独特市场的行政数据来估计对工伤保险的需求，利用监管保费的更新来识别。我们发现，保费增加1%会导致保险覆盖率下降约0.3%。根据估计值和成本数据，我们研究了政府干预增加保险覆盖率的潜在正当性，分析表明，几种形式的市场失灵--如逆向选择、市场力和外部性--可能无法证明在这种情况下的（政府干预）授权（正当性）。 Workers' compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premium updates for identification. We find that a 1 percent increase in premiums leads to approximately a 0.3 percent decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and data on costs, we examine potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage. This analysis suggests that several forms of market failure—such as adverse selection, market power, and externalities—may not justify a mandate in this setting. 参考文献：Cabral, Marika, Can Cui, and Michael Dworsky. 2022. "The Demand for Insurance and Rationale for a Mandate: Evidence from Workers' Compensation Insurance." American Economic Review, 112 (5): 1621-68. 8. 使用工具变量估计信号传递和雇主学习 Signaling and Employer Learning with Instruments 本文考虑在雇主学习模型中使用工具变量来识别和估计教育的私人和社会回报。一个工具变量所识别的作用取决于它是对雇主隐藏的，还是透明的（即观察到的）：隐藏的可以确定教育的个人回报，而透明的可以确定教育的社会回报。我们利用挪威非中心城市和中心城市的义务教育法的变化，分别构建了隐藏和透明的工具变量。我们估计私人回报为7.9%，其中70%是由于生产力的提高，其余30%是由于信号传递。 This paper considers the use of instruments to identify and estimate private and social returns to education within a model of employer learning. What an instrument identifies depends on whether it is hidden from, or transparent (i.e., observed) to, the employers. A hidden instrument identifies private returns to education, and a transparent instrument identifies social returns to education. We use variation in compulsory schooling laws across noncentral and central municipalities in Norway to, respectively, construct hidden and transparent instruments. We estimate a private return of 7.9 percent, of which 70 percent is due to increased productivity and the remaining 30 percent is due to signaling. 参考文献：Aryal, Gaurab, Manudeep Bhuller, and Fabian Lange. 2022. "Signaling and Employer Learning with Instruments." American Economic Review, 112 (5): 1669-1702. 9. 多维拍卖合同：实证分析 Multidimensional Auctions of Contracts: An Empirical Analysis 在本文中，我们对私人信息为多维时具有一般分配规则的多属性合同拍卖进行了结构分析。考虑内生的事后行动并对投标人的合同价值建模后，我们使用非参数方法，从投标人的出价和联合分布中确定了投标人的私人信息。通过分析路易斯安那州石油租约的现金特许权使用费拍卖，我们发现在逆向选择和道德风险的情况下，政府收入更差，开发率也不比有固定特许权使用费的现金拍卖好。我们的研究结果修正了关于多属性拍卖最优性的传统观点。 In this paper, we conduct a structural analysis of multi-attribute auctions of contracts with a general allocation rule when private information is multidimensional. Upon modeling bidders' contract value that accounts for their endogenous ex post actions, we non-parametrically identify bidders' private information from their bids and estimate their joint distribution. Analyzing cash-royalty auctions of Louisiana oil leases, we find government revenue worse and development rates no better than in a cash auction with a fixed royalty in view of adverse selection and moral hazard. Our findings revise conventional wisdom on the optimality of multi-attribute auctions. 参考文献：Kong, Yunmi, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong. 2022. "Multidimensional Auctions of Contracts: An Empirical Analysis." American Economic Review, 112 (5): 1703-36. 10. 国内企业如何应对本地成本冲击？ How Do National Firms Respond to Local Cost Shocks? 最近的研究表明，因为全国性的连锁店收取的价格在地域上是统一的，导致价格对当地的需求状况不敏感。我们利用96家多州连锁店的35151家零售店的数据，研究了对当地成本冲击的价格反应，包括68个消费税变化、76个销售税变化和其他基于地域的成本差异。我们发现当地的成本冲击传递到了当地价格上，在其他受影响的连锁店中，没有对未受影响的商店产生溢出效应，而且全国性和地方性连锁店的比率相似。企业根据当地成本变化调整当地价格，这表明零售商对当地成本和需求冲击的反应是不对称的。 Recent research shows prices are insensitive to local demand conditions because national chains charge geographically uniform prices. We examine the price response to local cost shocks, including 68 excise tax changes, 76 sales tax changes, and other geographically based cost differences, using data on 35,151 retail stores in 96 multi-state chains. We find local cost shocks are passed through to local prices, with no spillovers to unaffected stores in otherwise affected chains, and at similar rates for national and local chains. Firms adjust local prices according to local cost changes, suggesting retailers respond asymmetrically to local cost and demand shocks. 参考文献：Butters, R. Andrew, Daniel W. Sacks, and Boyoung Seo. 2022. "How Do National Firms Respond to Local Cost Shocks?" American Economic Review, 112 (5): 1737-72.