Electric vehicles (EVS) appear unstoppable. Carmakers are outpledgingthemselves in terms of production goals. Industry analysts are struggling to keep up. Battery-powered cars may zoom from 10% of global vehicle sales in 2021 to 40% by 2030, according to BloombergNEF. De- pending on whom you ask, that could translate to between 25m and 40m EVS a year. They, and the tens of millions manufactured between now and then, will need plenty of batteries. Bernstein reckons that demand from EVS will grow six-fold by 2030 (see chart 1), to 2,700 gigawatt-hours (GWh). Rystad puts it at 4,000GWh.

电动汽车 (EVS) 似乎势不可挡。 汽车制造商在生产目标方面正在超越自己。 行业分析师正在努力跟上。 据彭博新能源财经报道，到 2030 年，电池驱动汽车在全球汽车销量中的占比可能会从 2021 年的 10% 增长到40%。 根据您询问的对象，这可能会转化为每年 2500 万到 4000 万的EVS。 它们，以及从现在到那时制造的数以千万计的车，将需要大量的电池。 Bernstein 估计，到 2030 年，EVS的需求将增长六倍（见图 1），达到2,700 吉瓦时 (GWh)。 Rystad 将其定为 4,000GWh。

Such forecasts explain the frenziedactivity up and down the battery value chain. The ferment stretches from the salt flats of Chile’s Atacama desert, where lithium is mined, to the plains of Hungary, where on August 12th CATL of China, the world’s biggest battery-maker, announced a €7.3bn ($7.5bn) investment to build its second European “gigafactory”.

这样的预测解释了电池价值链上下的疯狂活动。 从开采锂的智利阿塔卡马沙漠的盐滩一直到匈牙利平原，8 月 12 日，世界最大的电池制造商中国宁德时代宣布投资73 亿欧元（合 75 亿美元）建造 它的第二个欧洲“超级工厂”。

It is, however, looking increasingly as though the activity is not quite frenzied enough, especially for the Western car companies that are desperate to reduce their dependence on China’s world-leading battery industry amid rising geopolitical tensions. Prices of battery metals have spiked (see chart 2 on later page) and are expected to push battery costs up in 2022 for the first time in more than a decade.

然而，看起来这种活动似乎还不够疯狂，特别是对于在地缘政治紧张局势加剧的情况下迫切希望减少对中国世界领先电池行业的依赖的西方汽车公司而言。 电池金属价格飙升（见后页图 2），预计将在 2022 年推动电池成本十多年来首次上涨。

In June BloombergNEF cast doubt on its earlier prediction that the cost of buying and running an EV would be as low as for a fossil-fuel car by 2024. More distant targets, such as the EU’s coming ban on new sales of carbon-burning cars by 2035, may not be met. Could the EV boom run out of juicebefore it gets going in earnest?

6 月，BloombergNEF彭博新能源财经 对其早些时候的预测表示怀疑，即到2024 年购买和运行电动汽车的成本将与化石燃料汽车一样低。更遥远的目标，例如欧盟即将禁止新销售碳燃烧汽车 到 2035 年，可能无法实现。 电动汽车热潮在真正开始之前会耗尽动力吗？

On paper, there ought to be plenty of batteries to go round. Benchmark Minerals, a consultancy, has analysed manufacturers’ declared plans and found that, if they materialise, 282 new gigafactories should come online worldwide by 2031. That would take total global capacity to 5,800GWh. It is also a big “if”. Bernstein cal- culates that current and promised future supply from the six established battery- makers—BYD and CATL of China; LG, Sam- sung and SK Innovation of South Korea; and Panasonic of Japan—adds up to 1,360GWh by the end of the decade. The balance would have to come from newcomers, and being a newcomer in a capital-intensive industry is never easy.

在纸面上，应该有足够的电池来运转。 咨询公司Benchmark Minerals 分析了制造商宣布的计划，发现如果这些计划实现，到2031 年，全球将有 282 家新的超级工厂投产。这将使全球总产能达到 5,800GWh。 这也是一个很大的“如果”。 伯恩斯坦计算出，六家老牌电池制造商——中国的比亚迪和宁德时代、韩国的 LG、三星和 SK Innovation 以及日本的松下——目前和承诺的未来供应量将在本世纪末达到1,360GWh。 平衡必须来自市场新进入者，在资本密集型行业成为新来者绝非易事。

The optimistic overall capacity projections conceal other problems. Matteo Fini of S&P Global Mobility, a consultancy, notes that gigafactories take three years to build but require longer—possibly a few extra years—to manufacture at full capacity. As such, actual output by 2030 may fall short. Moreover, manufacturers’ unique technologies and specifications mean that cells from one factory are usually not interchangeable with those from another, which could create further bottlenecks.

乐观的总体产能预测掩盖了其他问题。 咨询公司S&P Global Mobility 的 Matteo Fini 指出，超级工厂需要三年时间才能建成，但需要更长的时间——可能还需要几年时间——才能满负荷生产。 因此，到 2030 年的实际产出可能会不足。 此外，制造商独特的技术和规格意味着一个工厂的电池通常不能与另一个工厂的电池互换，这可能会造成进一步的瓶颈。

Most troubling for Western carmakers is China’s dominance of battery-making. The country houses close to 80% of the world’s current cell-manufacturing capacity. Benchmark Minerals forecasts that China’s share will decline in the next decade or so, but only a bit—to just under 70%. By then America would be home to just 12% of global capacity, with Europe accounting for most of the rest.

对西方汽车制造商来说，最令人不安的是中国在电池制造领域的主导地位。 该国拥有全球当前电池制造能力的近 80%。 Benchmark Minerals 预测，中国的份额将在未来十年左右下降，但只会下降一点点——略低于 70%。 届时，美国将仅占全球产能的 12%，而欧洲则占其余大部分。

Americans’ slower uptake of EVS may ease the crunch for carmakers there. Deloitte, a consultancy, expects America to account for fewer than 5m vehicles of the 31m EVS sold in 2030, compared with 15m in China and 8m in Europe. Detroit’s auto giants already have joint ventures with the big South Korean battery-makers to build domestic gigafactories. In July Ford and SK Innovation finalised a deal to build one in Tennessee and two in Kentucky, with the carmaker chipping in $6.6bn and SK Innovation $5.5bn.

The same month it struck a deal to import CATL batteries. General Motors and LG Energy are together putting more than $7bn into three battery factories in Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee.

美国人对电动汽车的缓慢吸收可能会缓解汽车制造商的紧缩。 咨询公司德勤预计，在 2030 年售出的3100 万辆电动汽车中，美国的汽车销量将不到500 万辆，而中国为 1500 万辆，欧洲为 800 万辆。 底特律的汽车巨头已经与韩国大型电池制造商建立了合资企业，以建立国内的超级工厂。 7月，福特和 SK Innovation 敲定了一项协议，在田纳西州建造一座，在肯塔基州建造两座，这家汽车制造商投资66 亿美元，SK Innovation投资 55 亿美元。

同月，它达成了进口宁德时代电池的协议。 通用汽车和LG 能源共同向密歇根州、俄亥俄州和田纳西州的三个电池工厂投入超过70 亿美元。

It is Europe’s carmakers that seem most exposed. Volkswagen plans to construct six gigafactories of its own by 2030. Some, such as BMW, are teaming up with the South Koreans. Others, including Mer­cedes­-Benz, are investing in European bat­tery­-making through a joint­-venture called ACC. A number of European startups, such as Northvolt of Sweden, which is backed by Volkswagen and Volvo, are also busily building capacity. Yet the continent’s car industry looks likely to remain quite reli­ant on Chinese manufacturers. Some of those batteries will be made locally: CATL’s first investment in Europe, a battery facto­ry in Germany, is set to begin operations at the end of the year. Some packs or their components may, however, still need to be imported from China.

欧洲的汽车制造商似乎受到的影响最大。 大众汽车计划到2030 年建造六座自己的超级工厂。宝马等一些工厂正在与韩国人合作。 其他公司，包括梅赛德斯-奔驰，正在通过一家名为ACC 的合资企业投资于欧洲的电池制造。 一些欧洲初创公司，例如由大众和沃尔沃支持的瑞典 Northvolt，也在忙于产能建设。 然而，欧洲大陆的汽车工业似乎仍然相当依赖中国制造商。 其中一些电池将在当地生产：宁德时代在欧洲的第一笔投资——位于德国的电池工厂，将于今年年底开始运营。 然而，一些包装或其组件可能仍需要从中国进口。

That is not a comfortable position to be in for European carmakers. It may become even less so if the EU enacts levies based on total lifecycle emissions from vehicles, in­cluding EVS. Northvolt’s chief executive, Peter Carlsson, reckons that proposed EU tariffs on carbon­intensive imports could add 5-­8% to the cost of a Chinese battery made using dirty coal power. That could be roughly equivalent to an extra $500, give or take, per pack. Such rules would boost his firm’s prospects, since it runs on clean Nordic hydroelectricity. It would also se­verely limit European carmakers’ ability to source batteries from abroad.

对于欧洲汽车制造商来说，这不是一个舒适的位置。 如果欧盟根据车辆（包括电动汽车）的总生命周期排放量征收税款，情况可能会变得更糟。Northvolt 的首席执行官 Peter Carlsson 认为，欧盟提议对碳密集型进口产品征收关税可能会使使用肮脏煤电制造的中国电池的成本增加5-8%。 这可能大致相当于每包额外的 500 美元左右。 这些规则将提升他公司的前景，因为它依靠清洁的北欧水力发电。 它还将严重限制欧洲汽车制造商从国外采购电池的能力。

These manufacturing bottlenecks, seri­ous though they are, look manageable next to those at the mining end of the battery value chain. Take nickel. Thanks to a production jump in Indonesia, which accounts for 37% of global output, the mar­ ket seems well supplied. However, Indone­sian nickel is not the high-­grade sort usable in batteries.

这些制造瓶颈虽然很严重，但与电池价值链采矿端的那些瓶颈相比，看起来是可以控制的。 拿镍来说。 由于占全球产量37% 的印度尼西亚产量大幅增加，市场似乎供应充足。 然而，印尼镍并不是可用于电池的高级品种。

It can be made into bat­tery­-compatible stuff, but that means smelting it twice, which emits three times more carbon than refining higher-­grade ores from places like Canada, New Caledo­nia or Russia. Those additional emissions defeat the purpose of making EVS, notes Socrates Economou of Trafigura, a com­modities trader. Carmakers, particularly European ones, may shun the stuff.

它可以制成与电池兼容的材料，但这意味着将其冶炼两次，所排放的碳是从加拿大、新喀里多尼亚或俄罗斯等地精炼更高品位矿石的三倍。 大宗商品交易商 Trafigura 的苏格拉底·埃科诺穆指出，这些额外的排放量违背了制造电动汽车的目的。 汽车制造商，尤其是欧洲汽车制造商，可能会避开这些东西。

Cobalt has become less of a pinch point. A price spike in 2018 prompted battery­-makers to develop battery chemistriesthat use much less of it. Planned mine expan­sions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), home to the world’s richest cobalt deposits, and Indonesia should also tide battery-­makers over until 2027. After that things get trickier. Getting more of the metal may require manufacturers to em­brace the DRC’s artisanal mining, the formalisation of which has yet to bear fruit. Until it does, many Western carmakers say they would not touch the sector—where adults and many children toil in harsh conditions—with a barge-pole.

钴已不再是一个关键点。 2018 年的价格飙升促使电池制造商开发电池化学以使用更少的钴。 计划在刚果民主共和国 (DRC) 的矿山扩张，该国拥有世界上最丰富的钴矿床，以及印度尼西亚，应该让电池制造商渡过难关，直到2027 年。在那之后，事情变得更加棘手。 获得更多金属可能需要制造商接受刚果民主共和国的手工采矿，其正规化尚未取得成果。 在此之前，许多西方汽车制造商表示，他们不会接触这个行业——成年人和许多儿童在恶劣的条件下辛勤劳作。

Most uncertainty concerns lithium. A shortage is forcing some manufacturers to cut production. For now consumer­-elec­tronics firms are bearing the brunt. But their gadgets’ smaller batteries represent a fraction of demand. EV-makers, whose battery packs use a lot more, could be next.

大多数不确定性都与锂有关。 短缺迫使一些制造商减产。 目前，消费电子公司首当其冲， 但他们的小装置的小电池只占需求的一小部分。 使用更多电池组的电动汽车制造商可能是下一个。

By 2026 the lithium market is projected to tip back into surplus, thanks to planned new projects. However, most of these are in China and rely on lower-­grade deposits which are much costlier to process than those of Australia’s hard­rock mines or Latin America’s brine ponds. Mr Economou estimates that a price of $35,000 per tonne of the battery­-usable form of lithium carbonate is required to make such pro­jects worthwhile—lower than today’s lofty levels, but three times those a year ago.

由于计划中的新项目，预计到 2026 年锂市场将重新出现过剩。 然而，其中大部分都在中国，并且依赖于低品位矿床，这些矿床的加工成本比澳大利亚的硬岩矿或拉丁美洲的盐水池要高得多。 Economou 先生估计，每吨电池35,000 美元的价格——碳酸锂的可用形式是使此类项目有价值的必要条件——低于今天的高价，但是一年前的三倍。

High­grade lithium due to come from elsewhere should not be taken for granted, either. Chile’s new draft constitution, which will be put to a referendum in Sep­tember, proposes nationalising all natural resources. Changes to the tax regime in Australia, which already has some of the highest mining levies in the world, could deter fresh investments in “green”­-metal production. In late July the boss of Albemarle, the largest publicly traded lithium producer, warned that, despite efforts to unlock more supply, carmakers faced a fierce battle for the metal until 2030.

来自其他地方的高品位锂也不应该被认为是理所当然的。 智利的新宪法草案将于 9 月进行全民公决，提议将所有自然资源国有化。 澳大利亚已经拥有世界上最高的采矿税，其税收制度的变化可能会阻止对“绿色”金属生产的新投资。 7月下旬，最大的上市锂生产商 Albemarle 的老板警告说，尽管努力释放更多供应，汽车制造商在 2030 年之前仍面临着激烈的金属争夺战。

Because building mines can take any­where between five and 25 years, there is little time left to get new ones up and run­ning this decade. Big miners are reluctant to enter the business. Markets for green metals remain too small to be worth the hassle for the mining “majors”, says the de­velopment boss at one such firm. Despite their reputation for doing business in shady places, most lack the stomach to take a gamble on countries as tricky as the DRC, where it is hard to enforce contracts. Smaller miners that usually get risky projects off the ground cannot raise capital on listed markets, where investors are queasyabout the mining industry, which is consi­dered risky and, ironically, environmentally unfriendly.

因为建造矿山可能需要 5 到25 年之间的任何时间，所以在这十年中几乎没有时间让新矿山投入运营。 大型矿企不愿进入该行业。 一家这样的公司的开发负责人表示，绿色金属市场仍然太小，不值得矿业“巨头”来解决。 尽管他们以在阴暗的地方做生意而闻名，但大多数人都没有勇气在刚果（金）这样难以执行合同的棘手国家下赌注。 通常启动风险项目的小型矿商无法在上市市场筹集资金，投资者对采矿业感到不安，因为采矿业被认为是有风险的，而且具有讽刺意味的是，它对环境不友好。

The resulting dearth of capital is at­tracting private-­equity firms (often found­ed by former mining executives) and manufacturers with a taste for vertical in­tegration. Battery­makers like LG and CATL have backed mining projects. Since the start of 2021 car firms have made around 20 investments in battery­-grade nickel, and five others in lithium and cobalt. Most of these projects involved Western compa­nies. In March, for example, Volkswagen announced a joint venture with two Chi­nese miners to secure nickel and cobalt for its EV factories in China. In July General Motors said it would pay Livent, a lithium producer, $200m upfront to secure lumps of the white metal. The American EV cham­pion, Tesla, is signing deals left and right.

由此导致的资本匮乏吸引了私募股权公司（通常由前矿业高管创立）和喜欢垂直整合的制造商。LG 和 CATL 等电池制造商支持采矿项目。 自2021 年初以来，汽车公司已对电池级镍进行了约20 项投资，另有 5 项投资用于锂和钴。 大多数这些项目都涉及西方公司。 例如，今年 3 月，大众汽车宣布与两家中国矿业公司成立合资企业，为其在中国的电动汽车工厂确保镍和钴的供应。 通用汽车公司在 7 月表示，将向锂生产商Livent 支付 2 亿美元的预付款，以获取白金属块。 美国电动汽车冠军特斯拉正在到处签署交易。

Mick Davis, a coal­-mining veteran now at Vision Blue Resources, a firm that in­vests in smaller miners, doubts all this dealmaking will be enough to plug the funding gap. Recycling, which makes up a quarter of supply in many mature metals markets, is not expected to help much before 2030. Tweaks to battery designs may moderate demand for the scarcestmetals somewhat, but at the risk of lower battery performance. Lithium in particular will re­main hard to substitute. Technologies that do away with it entirely, such as sodium­ based cathodes, are a long way off.

米克戴维斯现在在 Vision Blue Resources 工作，该公司是一家投资小型矿工的公司，他怀疑所有这些交易是否足以填补资金缺口。 在许多成熟金属市场中，占供应量四分之一的回收利用预计在 2030 年之前不会有太大帮助。电池设计的调整可能会在一定程度上缓和对最稀缺金属的需求，但存在电池性能下降的风险。 尤其是锂，仍将难以替代。 完全消除它的技术，例如钠基阴极，还有很长的路要走。

Even if the West’s EV industry somehow managed to secure enough metals and bat­tery­making capacity, it would still face a giant problem in the middle of the supply chain, refining, where China enjoys near­ monopolies (see chart 3). Chinese compa­nies refine nearly 70% of the world’s lith­ium, 84% of its nickel and 85% of its cobalt. Trafigura forecasts that the shares for the last two of these will remain above 75% for at least the next five years. And as with bat­tery manufacturers, Chinese refinersgob­ble up dirty coal­-generated electricity. On top of that, according to Trafigura, both European and North American firms are also expected to rely on foreign suppliers, often Chinese ones, for at least half the capacity to convert refined ores into the ma­terials that go into batteries.

即使西方的电动汽车产业以某种方式设法确保了足够的金属和电池制造能力，它仍将面临供应链中间的一个巨大问题，即中国几乎垄断的提炼环节（见图 3）。 中国公司提炼了全球近70% 的锂、84% 的镍和 85% 的钴。Trafigura 预测，其中最后两个的份额将至少在未来五年内保持在75% 以上。 与电池制造商一样，中国的提炼厂吞噬肮脏的燃煤发电。最重要的是，根据 Trafigura 的说法，预计欧洲和北美公司都将依赖外国供应商，通常是中国供应商，将精炼矿石转化为电池材料的产能至少有一半。

Western governments grasp the urgent need to diversify their suppliers. Last year Joe Biden, America’s president, unveiled a blueprint for a domestic battery supply chain. His huge infrastructure law, passed in 2021, set aside $3bn for battery-­making in America. The Inflation Reduction Act, which he signed into law on August 16th, also includes sweeteners for the industry, so long as the ores, refined materials and components come from America or allied countries. The EU, which created a battery alliance in 2017 to co­ordinate public and private efforts, says €127bn was invested last year across the supply chain, with an additional €382bn expected by 2030.

Most of this is likely to land downstream, help­ing the West become self­-sufficient in the production of finished cells by 2027.

西方政府意识到供应商多元化的迫切需要。 去年，美国总统乔·拜登公布了国内电池供应链的蓝图。 他于2021 年通过的庞大基础设施法为美国的电池制造预留了30 亿美元。 他于 8 月16 日签署成为法律的《降低通胀法案》也包括该行业的甜味剂，只要矿石、精炼材料和组件来自美国或盟国。 欧盟于 2017 年成立了一个电池联盟以协调公共和私营部门的努力，该联盟表示，去年在整个供应链上投资了1270 亿欧元，预计到 2030 年将再增加 3820 亿欧元。

其中大部分可能会落到下游，帮助西方在 2027 年之前实现成品电池生产的自给自足。

That is something. And newfound de­posits, better mining technology, cleverer battery chemistry and sacrifices on perfor­mance may yet combine to bring the mar­ket into balance. More probably, as Jean­ François Lambert, a commodities consul­ tant, puts it, the EV industry is “going to be living a big lie for quite some time”.

这很有意思。新发现的矿床、更好的采矿技术、更聪明的电池化学成分以及对性能的牺牲可能会结合起来使市场达到平衡。正如大宗商品顾问让·弗朗索瓦·兰伯特 (Jean François Lambert) 所说，更可能的是，电动汽车行业“将在相当长的一段时间内生活在一个大谎言中”。